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Abstract 
This paper considers the problem of Internet regulation, and how it has been 
exacerbated by poor theoretical models for cyberspace. Furthermore, it considers how 
the conceptual difficulties with regard to the nature of cyberspace have been 
replicated in formulation of regulation. Having identified the key areas of difficulty, 
this paper then explores a potential solution building on the regulatory work of Chris 
Reed and Christopher Marsden. Using autopoietic theory to fuse their understanding 
of both the human, and technological aspects of Internet regulation, this paper aims to 
generate one coherent theory that would offer a flexible, responsive and effective 
regulatory model for cyberspace. 
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1. Introduction 
“Seeing the elephant”, is an American phrase that was commonly used in the mid to 
late 19th century. It refers to learning about a wondrous new thing (like seeing a circus 
elephant for the first time) and often, though not always, this knowledge is tinged with 
disappointment. Subsequently, historians have revived the phrase. One particularly 
apposite use is that of John Reid who used the phrase as the title for his work on the 
bringing of law to the Western frontier.1 Elephant is used here to evoke all these 
images, excitement, deflation and the journey of law to new land. Internet Technology 
has now developed to the point that we are able to speak of multiple generations and 
kinds of networked technology. The Internet is now accessible via not just computers 
but also mobile phones, Netbooks and other wireless and wired devices (e.g. 
televisions and Ebook readers). 
The Internet is also the subject of more legislation than at any time before and also 
subject to a broader range of regulatory activities than at any time before. Yet, despite 
this apparent colonisation of cyberspace by the legal realm, there are clear indicators 
that there is serious and meaningful conflict going on between traditional (and pseudo 
traditional) legal definitions and jurisdictional markers on the one hand, and 
technological development on the other.  
The contention at the heart of this paper is that lawyers are not, as they might imagine, 
intrepid explorers who have successfully colonised a new territory, but are instead, 
like the folk tale of the blind men arguing over the nature of the elephant when they 
have only held a trunk or a tail. In other words, lawyers have struggled to develop a 
conceptual model of cyberspace that is in complete harmony with technological and 
social reality, and even where adequate conceptual models are developed they are 
applied within inadequate or inappropriate regulatory frameworks. With this problem 
in mind we shall build upon the work of Andrew Murray on law and autopoiesis in 
cyberspace regulation. This paper argues that an appropriate model can be found but 
only if the emphasis in the search shifts from asking either whether cyberspace 
constitutes a new and distinct jurisdiction or considering the relationships and human 
connections which occur when users are connected by networks, to a mode of analysis 
that recognises that both these elements are intrinsic parts of the system and takes 
advantage of them. 
The advent of cyberspace into the day to day fabric of modern society has caused 
digital communications to become an important legislative and regulatory object. 
Lawyers and policy makers from a variety of philosophies and backgrounds have 
endeavoured to describe and conceptualise the nature of cyberspace. Thus, positions 
and perspectives on the issues have proliferated. The thesis at the heart of this paper is 
that legal theory and practice are currently lagging behind technological and social 
developments, because despite repeated attempts to do so, we have not yet developed 
an appropriate conception of cyberspace and its role in modern life which can be 
dovetailed into a functional regulatory model. This deficiency is partially the result of 
the genuine novelty of the technological phenomena, and partially the product of the 
                                                
1 J Reid, Law for the Elephant: Property and Behaviour on the Overland Trail (California: University 
of California Press, 1996). 
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legal tendency to reason from analogies to well-established phenomena, or earlier 
legal theories. This tendency, although not necessarily harmful in and of itself, can 
become damaging when an analogy is viewed as a like-for-like comparison, 
regardless of the actual degree of fit (likeness) with the phenomenon being analysed.  
In this section we shall briefly explore the problems of conceptualising cyberspace, 
before considering the conceptions which have been adopted. We shall also consider 
the degree of fit that the common legal analogies have with technology. Ultimately, 
building on the work of Murray, we shall conclude with some suggestions of how to 
formulate a paradigm based upon autopoiesis which fits more completely with 
developing technologies and offers a path toward a functional and efficient mode of 
regulation 
1.1 The conceptual problems posed by cyberspace 
To those already cognisant of this debate, the use of the term cyberspace itself pre-
supposes a particular view of the environments created by networked technologies. 
However, the term cyberspace will be used in this paper because its meaning is 
generally clear, and the formulation of a truly neutral term would be difficult and 
cumbersome. In a general sense, the problem of the theorisation of cyberspace is that 
it exacerbates our difficulties of description and conceptualisation. Simply put, our 
ability to conceive something is limited by our language, our physical perceptions and 
our mode of reasoning.2 When considering cyberspace the challenges faced by our 
conceptual tools are readily apparent, as there is a vast range of new types of 
communications, interactions, and activities possible and even technological and 
cultural experts cannot be appraised of all developments at all times. Legal modes of 
discourse have not acted as a panacea to this problem. Indeed, as Svantesson has 
noted, legal reasoning may be particularly vulnerable to these problems because of its 
lack of direct consideration of cyberspace in itself as opposed to cyberspace as a legal 
subject: 
...faced with the task of evaluating the applicability of existing legal 
rules to fact scenarios involving Internet activities...it has been 
remarked that “[j]udges and legislators faced with adapting existing 
legal standards to the novel environment of cyberspace struggle 
with terms and concepts that the average American five-year-old 
tosses about with breezy familiarity.” ...one of the reasons why 
judges and legislators, as well as other legal professionals, struggle 
with the new technology, is that surprisingly little efforts have been 
directed at analysing what makes the Internet different.3   
                                                
2 This problem and the philosophical gap between the conception and the thing described have been 
explored at length in the work of A Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian 
Systems and General Semantics (Closter, NJ: Institute of General Semantics, 1995). 
3 D Svantesson, “The characteristics making Internet communication challenge traditional models of 
regulation: What every international jurist should know about the Internet” (2005) 13 International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology 39-69, at 40. 
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Whilst, ultimately, this article wishes to suggest methodologies for regulators to 
engage more directly with Internet technology and possible theoretical frameworks 
for doing so, it will first be necessary to explain the prevalent legal analogies for 
cyberspace and offer some illustrations of the mismatch between them and 
technological and social realities. It is hoped that this article would serve as a spark to 
ignite further thought in the area. 
2. Prevalent analogies 
The central question for lawyers, accustomed as we are to considering the world in 
terms of rules and the ability to apply them through the exercise of jurisdiction, is: 
“How will we control cyberspace?”. Intrinsically linked with this question are the 
related queries: “Is cyberspace a new and different space to those we have 
experienced before?” and “Do we need new means of regulation to exercise our 
jurisdiction?” (readers should note that the legal discourse has been marked by a lack 
of consideration of the otherwise a priori question “Do we have jurisdiction?”. 
Jurisdiction has been treated by legal commentators as something of a given, as we 
shall see when we look at the cyber-sceptic, and some elements of the cyber-
conservationist approaches). Thus, we shall be considering how the core analogies 
conceptualise cyberspace as a space (or not) and the type of legislative response this 
engenders. It should be noted at this point that many of these modes of analysis were 
adopted in the mid to late 1990s, as affordable personal computers and Internet 
connections became more readily available in the home, and thus raised the profile of 
the Internet as a domestic regulatory issue. Many models have evolved little since 
then. As we shall see, the legal mode of discourse vacillates between concern with the 
“space” of cyberspace and the jurisdictional challenges it poses, and concern focusing 
purely on regulatory behaviours and how to control the interactions of users. In other 
words, the discourse has always been a focused on the appropriate reaction of 
legal/political institutions to cyberspace and the interactions that it facilitates not an 
examination of that space or those interactions for their own sake. This perspective 
has caused legal discourse to miss some of the self-regulatory potential of the sphere. 
2.1 Cyber-libertarians 
The essence of the cyber-libertarian approach is that cyberspace is a distinct new 
space and that it can (or should) not be regulated by the state.4 This approach was first 
developed by the more thoughtful technologists among the early adopters of the 
Internet. It reflected their personal aspirations and attitudes. Furthermore, the 
                                                
4 It may be useful here to recall that many of these theories have an American origin and so the 
definition of libertarian used here means not only someone who focuses on the protection of freedoms 
but it is also coloured by that exclusively US brand of Libertarianism which focuses on the limitation 
of state power and emphasises that any power exercised by the state is enjoyed purely because of the 
voluntary consent of the governed. This US approach can lead the brand libertarian being applied to 
many thinkers who would be labelled conservative or reactionary elsewhere. This is not the case with 
cyber-libertarians but this has been part of the reasoning behind some of the categorisations used later 
in this article. For a discussion of the various forms of libertarianism prevalent in the US today an 
accessible biography of many of the main players can be found in  W Block, “I Choose Liberty: 
Biographies of Contemporary Libertarians” (2010) available at 
http://www.mises.org/books/chose_liberty_block.pdf (accessed 20 July 2012). 
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technology, as they saw it, not only functioned better without centralised control but 
made such control impossible. A good example of this early form of cyber-libertarian 
thought is John Perry Barlow’s “A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace”.5  
The “Declaration” is a polemic written after the American government passed 
telecommunications legislation which Barlow viewed as overly invasive. Its key 
points are firstly, that cyberspace is a new and distinct space, and secondly its 
denizens use technological means to develop their own form(s) of social contract 
independent of traditional established states and without the preconceptions caused by 
physical embodiment. Formal governments have, according to Barlow, no mandate 
for interference with such a sphere, nor indeed the ability to interfere in the normal 
way. 
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, 
and context do not apply to us. They are based on matter, There is 
no matter here...The only law that all our constituent cultures would 
generally recognize is the Golden Rule. We hope we will be able to 
build our particular solutions on that basis. But we cannot accept the 
solutions you are attempting to impose.6  
Barlow himself described the language of the declaration as grandiose in the message 
preceding it. Despite Barlow's recognition that text was an aspirational document and 
not a practical manifesto it did provide the mode of thought underpinning the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation - a powerful cyberspace lobbying group. Lawyers 
were attracted by the resonances this radical agenda had for more classical libertarian 
views about personal freedom and democracy. The key work in this more legally 
oriented vein is Johnson and Post’s Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace.7 This paper agreed that centralised control in the form of the sovereign 
state was not workable in cyberspace. However, they also strongly believed that users 
would develop their own customary law organically as they selected rule sets and 
cyberspace zones suitable for their own needs; thus the only possible regulatory 
system was the one developed by the consent of the users. 
But when the ‘persons’ in question are not whole people, when their 
‘property’ is intangible and portable, and when all concerned may 
readily escape a jurisdiction they do not find empowering, the 
relationship between the ‘citizen’ and the ‘state’ changes radically. 
Law, defined as a thoughtful group conversation about core values, 
will persist. But it will not, could not, and should not be the same 
law as that applicable to physical, geographically-defined 
territories.8  
The cyber-libertarians face wide-reaching difficulties. The traditional, 
                                                
5 J Barlow, “A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace” (1996) available at 
 http://www.ibiblio.org/netchange/hotstuff/barlow.html (accessed 20 July 2012). 
6 Ibid. 
7 D Johnson and D Post, “Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace” (1996) 48 Stanford Law 
Review 1367-1402. 
8Ibid VI.  
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technologically-focused branch of this school was correct in identifying that new 
methods of control outside the purview of the state would develop.  However, as a 
rule these sorts of controls require technical power (the ability to silence other users, 
cancel their communications or exclude them from the space) or group sanction 
(flaming).9 In practice this means they are often only available to enforce policies laid 
down by the cyberspace locations creator or controller, who have a privileged position 
to exercise such rights or to gather community support. Such mechanisms are often 
either inefficient or inaccessible for many users as they require contact with a 
technical controller or their representative, or stirring up group support. Furthermore, 
users might fear reprisal and an escalation of conflict.10 
The more legally minded libertarian approaches wish to view cyberspace as a location 
with potential for re-invigoration of civil society and democracy through the 
development of mutually agreed rules about the rights and duties of individuals. This 
has had problems on two levels. The first level is in the balancing of interests or clash 
of rights.11 Prioritisation is a general difficulty with regard to human rights, but it 
holds particular problems for cyberspace because the current prioritisation of rights 
will always favour anything with an offline or corporeal element.12 Naturally, the 
right to life and freedom from torture, and always should, trump expression in a real 
world context. However, is this a fair method of prioritisation in the on-line context 
where everything is expression? Many rights infringements that seriously impact on 
the quality of a person’s cyber-life, for example, being cheated of virtual property in a 
game world, seem trivial or even absurd when viewed through the lens of standard 
rights analysis.13 If legal scholars struggle with conceptualising and prioritising rights, 
how could user groups be expected to resolve this weighty dilemma for themselves as 
the cyber-libertarians suggest? Even if the obvious solution of treating all expressions 
as equal is adopted, this does not resolve the practical problem of the difficulty of 
accessing technical enforcement mechanisms. 
Enforcement is at the core of the second issue with this type of theory. Who has the 
obligation to ensure we enjoy our rights online? Who has the duty that is the corollary 
of our individual rights? As citizens in the off-line world our rights are secured by the 
coercive power of the state, but there is no cyberstate government (nor would many of 
                                                
9 For an overview of this kind of control mechanism see T Maltz, “Customary Law & Power in Internet 
Communities” (1996) 2 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication available at 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol2/issue1/custom.html (accessed 20 July 2012). 
10 A useful critique of this approach to control can be found in N Netanal, “Cyberspace Self-
Governance: A Sceptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory” (2000) 88 California Law Review 
395-498. 
11 For a taste of how complex this issue can be see P Montague, “When Rights Conflict”' (2001) 7 
Legal Theory  257–277. 
12 A simple but illustrative example of this can be found in the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The absolute rights are largely of a physical nature, for example the right to life, freedom from torture 
and slavery etc. The limited or qualified rights deal with intangibles and focus on physical things 
necessary to take part  in the life of a democratic society (freedom of assembly and expression (the 
emphasis being on political protest). Clearly, this prioritisation favours physical embodiment. 
13 See S Wolfendale, "Virtual Harm and Attachment" (2009) available at 
 www.aifs.gov.au/acssa/pubs/newsletter/n21pdf/n21d.pdf (accessed 20 July 2012) and A Arias, "Life, 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Swords and Armour: Regulating the Theft of Virtual Goods" (2007-2008) 57 
Emory Law Journal 1301-1346. 
(2012) 9:2 SCRIPTed 
 
136 
those espousing user empowerment in this space wish there to be). Self-regulation 
mechanisms can work quite well, but only where there is a clear context and 
description of the rights and obligations involved (for example the voluntary 
arbitration schemes used by many online market places). However, not all interactions 
are so clear cut. A single interaction may involve multiple users across a range of 
countries, inhabiting different personae to those recognised as bearing rights as 
citizens by their states. Rights need to be re-conceptualised for cyberspace, not simply 
applied to it. Communication and expression need to be given their proper weight for 
this sphere. It is not clear, how user-led cyber-democracies on their own, can create a 
functional and legitimate rights enforcement mechanism, beyond the limited scenarios 
already discussed. An assertion that this will evolve organically will not actually 
cause this to happen and it certainly will not cause it to happen in a sustainable and 
appropriate way. 
2.2 Cyber-sceptics 
As the name suggests the cyber-sceptics do not agree that cyberspace is a distinct 
jurisdiction; for them it is the same as any other human technology and those who 
purport to find such a new phenomenon in cyberspace are mere meddlers and 
dilettantes. Rather, academics would be better spending their time diligently pursuing 
the study of traditional legal subjects and, in understanding them, the appropriate 
principles to apply to cyberspace (or indeed any other new social phenomenon) would 
become apparent. Thus, as Easterbrook put it, since there was no law of the horse (the 
horse being a vital element in the colonisation and transformation of ) there was not 
nor should there be law of cyberspace:14  
 ...the best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavours 
is to study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; 
others deal with people kicked by horses; still more deal with the 
licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to 
horses, or with prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect these 
strands into a course on "The Law of the Horse" is doomed to be 
shallow and to miss unifying principles. Teaching 100 percent of the 
cases on people kicked by horses will not convey the law of torts 
very well. Far better for most students--better, even, for those who 
plan to go into the horse trade--to take courses in property, torts, 
transactions, and the like, adding to the diet of horse cases a 
smattering of transactions in cucumbers, cats, coal, and cribs. Only 
by putting the law of the horse in the context of broader rules about 
commercial endeavours could one really understand the law about 
horses.15   
This thinking is similar to the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin.16 Dworkin has 
                                                
14 F Easterbrook, “Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse” (1996) available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/law619/f2001/week15/easterbrook.pdf (accessed 20 July 
2012). 
15 Ibid, 207ff. 
16 R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Bristol: Gerald Duckworth & co., 1996). 
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hypothesised an idealised judge called Hercules, who extrapolates the correct answer 
to “hard” (morally  complex and/or legally unprecedented) cases by using his 
encyclopaedic knowledge of the law to work out what the “correct” resolution should 
be, based on the established principles of the legal system. Dworkin persists in the 
validity of the model despite the fact that Hercules is an idealised figure and no real 
human judge, no matter how learned, could possess the required degree of knowledge. 
The theory does, however, illustrate the tendency in legal thought to value consistency 
and conformity with established rules as the way to find the “right” answer to new 
problems rather than innovation or re-conceptualisation. 
The major benefit of this kind of approach, from a lawyer’s perspective, is that it 
permits a shift of focus and allows the issues around cyberspace to become legal 
rather than technological or social questions, thereby rendering them more amenable 
to regulation. In other words, the problems of cyberspace can be made to seem soluble 
by the application of established legal principles, and not as novel issues which need 
to be understood in their sociological or technological context. This approach fits well 
with the tendency identified by Shklar (which in some senses underpins this article) 
for lawyers to favour legal modes of discourse and to interpret actions and inter-
relations in terms of already established legal rules and analogies.17 However, as a 
corollary of that, this approach would seem to be particularly vulnerable with regard 
to Svantesson’s critique already mentioned: that it is technology which is the under-
examined aspect of the problem. Thus, further study of the law would be of little 
assistance as it does not help us identify the salient aspects of the technology.  
In some senses, the weaknesses of a system which refuses to recognise the novelty of 
a so transparently socially transformative technology should be readily apparent. 
Furthermore, we do have law for particular physical zones and spheres (maritime law 
and aviation law), therefore the “law of the horse” argument may just be another 
instance of embodiment bias and is certainly not definitive. The main reason for 
critiquing this model, however, is that the reification of legal rules and norms can lead 
to absurd results. A good example is the classification of removal of DRM (Digital 
Rights Management), or similar technologies, as a computer security/misuse offence. 
In other words, placing DRM removal within the class of activities which cause 
criminal harm to computers and networked systems (see the recent guidance on 
applying the Computer Misuse Act18). DRM systems limit the functionality of content 
files in accordance with the wishes of the original creator, and therefore, in a purely 
technical sense, actually prevent a computer from performing the full potential range 
of actions upon the file (for example copying or sharing). Given the obvious fact, that 
increasing a system’s functionality is the exact opposite of causing it harm, this 
illustrates the danger of legal debates which are not firmly grounded in technological 
reality. Due to purely legal considerations a copyright protection mechanism, inserted 
into systems purely to secure proprietary rights, can be given the same protection as 
something which is essential for safe functioning. Furthermore, this is despite the fact 
that many in the IT industry agree that DRM is a poor copyright protection system, in 
that it is both technically vulnerable and allows copyright holders to extend their 
rights beyond that afforded by copyright law (the so called “paracopyright” 
                                                
17 J Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
18 Crown Prosecution Service, “Computer Misuse Act 1990: Guidance” available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/computer_misuse_act_1990/index.html (accessed 20 July 2012). 
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protections). Therefore even the arguments to offer it legal protection on the basis of 
proprietary rights alone cannot really be justified.19 Legal modes of analysis clearly 
do not always fit with cyberspace.20 Cyberspace needs theory which allows it to be 
viewed as something affected by law without becoming solely defined by it and 
subject to it.  
2.3 Cyber-conservationists 
The label used for this section may be considered somewhat controversial due to the 
thinkers it brings together, since they are often viewed as being at opposite ends of the 
political spectrum. Nevertheless, there are two reasons for the adoption of this 
approach.  The first, and most compelling, is that both schools of thought adopt a 
viewpoint based upon the need to protect some component of the cyberspace equation 
from harm. Specifically, protecting unsuspecting users, menaced by the shadowy 
lurkers in the underbelly of the Net, or in contrast, protecting the much vaunted public 
forum of the Net itself, from the machinations of States and corporations. The second 
reason is that the libertarian approaches here are more strongly tinted by the 
conservatism inherent in the US definition of libertarianism we discussed above at 
footnote four. This re-classification highlights resonances between these two 
approaches that might otherwise be ignored as a result of their apparent political 
difference.  
The first conservationist approach is usually espoused by those from the political 
centre to right, who insist that cyberspace is a dangerous space, and therefore  that 
asserting control and normalising (or perhaps more correctly rendering it into 
established legal terms and categories) cyberspace, is necessary to protect national 
and user interests.21    
The second conservationist approach, which is usually adopted by those from the 
middle to left of the political spectrum, takes the view that cyberspace is not a 
dangerous but rather an endangered space (a view linked to the cyber-libertarian 
approach). These conservationists argue that the customs and values inherent in 
cyberspace need legal regulatory protection in order to preserve what is liberal and 
democratic about cyberspace from damaging external encroachment. This is an 
inherently precarious position and slightly self-contradictory from a purely logical 
                                                
19 e.g. D Burk, “Anti-Circumvention Misuse” (2002)  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=320961 
(accessed 20 July 2012). 
20 In order to maintain the focus of this work, I have chosen not to raise the question of the validity of 
applying copyright to software in this article. Nevertheless, the widespread debate about this question 
and Open and Free Software practices do add weight to the present argument that legal norms are out 
of step with technological considerations and non-traditional legal solutions should be favoured for 
technological and social reasons. 
21 An excellent example of this approach can be found in the extreme pornography laws in s63 of the 
United Kingdom's Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Although critics could dismiss this as a 
unique response to a tragic set of circumstances, when taken in conjunction with anti-grooming laws 
(the Sexual Offence Act 2003 makes specific reference to grooming), public information campaigns on 
cyber-safety for children and the prevalence of media reports highlighting the deleterious impact of 
social networking software on society, it becomes clear that there is a widely held view, influencing the 
public sphere, that cyberspace is inherently chaotic and dangerous and in need of control in order to 
protect both individuals and society. 
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perspective, but if the right balance of the competing interests is maintained it can 
work in practice. The key aspect in this conception is that the user is not treated as a 
vulnerable being who is potential prey to the dangers of this pervasive and pernicious 
space, but rather as an empowered and rational agent capable of choosing how to act. 
As an empowered actor the user is capable of making meaningful contributions to 
their virtual society through networking and the other technical opportunities that 
cyberspace offers. The goal then becomes to protect the elements of cyberspace which 
encourage and enable this capacity, in both individuals and groups. Thus, these 
thinkers become the environmentalists of cyberspace. From the legal perspective the 
best known thinker in this group is probably Lawrence Lessig. Lessig initially became 
concerned with intellectual property law and cyberspace because of his ideas about 
constitutional authenticity and the reasoning behind the ban on perpetual copyrights in 
the United States Constitution which seemed to be under attack from modern 
copyright practices (he has in fact now returned to constitutional law after many years 
of work on cyberspace and the development of the Creative Commons Licensing 
regime).22 The stated aim of Creative Commons is to: 
...use private rights to create public goods: creative works set free 
for certain uses. Like the free software and open-source movements, 
our ends are cooperative and community-minded, but our means are 
voluntary and libertarian. We work to offer creators a best-of-both-
worlds way to protect their works while encouraging certain uses of 
them – to declare ‘some rights reserved’.23   
The theoretical problems facing these conservationist approaches are fundamental. 
Despite their apparent differences they share the common element that, as the name 
suggests, they wish some element of human/technological interaction to remain stable 
and unchanged. Since technology is constantly advancing, and the underlying purpose 
of cyberspace is to facilitate communications and interactions, which given their 
social proliferation seem to include an ever expanding range of human activities, 
these approaches seem almost destined to fail because change is part of the essential 
nature of the cyberspace experience they wish to conserve. Furthermore, their 
definitions of what needs to be conserved either become stultified and unfeasibly 
restrictive, or evolve and change and thus defeat their own original goal of resisting 
change. To give a simple example, imagine as a libertarian conservationist one wished 
to preserve the democratic potential of a particular form of group self-governance 
online, and therefore, offered some form of legal support, like making community 
arbitrations legally binding. This would put a legal barrier in place to discourage 
communities from altering their own governance. This is surely contrary to the 
democratic principle one was trying to preserve. On the other hand if the protectionist 
school of cyber-conservation wished to protect users from a potential email scam and 
thus legally mandated the use of a certain type of filter, technological change would 
quickly make it redundant and leave users vulnerable and possibly with the false 
                                                
22 L Lessig, “Free Culture lecture” (31 Jan 2008) available at 
http://blip.tv/esfwork/lawrence-lessig-january-31st-2008-stanford-university-686508 (accessed 20 July 
2012). 
23 Creative Commons, “Some Rights Reserved: Building a Layer of Reasonable Copyright” (April 
2010) available at http://wiki.creativecommons.org/History (accessed 20 July 2012). 
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sense of security because of the filter law. 
The global nature of the cyberspace phenomenon means that there are legal 
enforceability issues for those who view cyberspace as dangerous (we shall return to 
the problems of technical enforceability later). In addition, there is also the clash of 
societal norms that such enforceability would cause. For those who wish to preserve 
cyberspace, viewing it as endangered by government encroachment, the hard truth is 
that the change in user demographics (the expansion of accessibility of the Internet 
from an educational and technological elite to large swathes of the population in 
developed nations) now means that cyberspace will be of prime concern to all 
national governments.24 Also the degree of knowledge and agency on the part of the 
user traditionally presupposed by this model is no longer tenable (hence the increased 
governmental interest). Cyberspace needs theory which allows the proper weighing 
and balancing of the factors influencing its self-creation in a dynamic fashion to be 
observed and taken into account. 
2.4 Politico-legal mappers 
These theorists begin to move beyond the idea of cyberspace as a space, into the 
consideration of cyberspace as a range of complex relationships. This approach can be 
seen as prefiguring and informing the position advocated in this paper, which hopes to 
build upon the strengths of this approach, by using an understanding of cyberspace 
interactions to inform the regulatory framework. The notion of treating cyberspace as 
a cartography of political relations mediated by technology began with Jeremy 
Crampton’s seminal work The Political Mapping of Cyberspace. Crampton is 
primarily a critical cartographer, who follows Foucauldian thought in holding 
cyberspace to be a space which simultaneously produces and is produced by human 
subjects. For the purposes of this paper Crampton’s work has two main themes. 
Firstly, examining how users create themselves in cyberspace based on Heidegger’s 
critique of the “metaphysics of presence”. 
Instead of practices which produce the truth concerning oneself in a 
field of normalization (traditional of juridico-religious confession) 
cyberspace can be the ground for self-writing in communities which 
effect an ethos of care of the self.25 
Secondly, Crampton then considers how cyberspace technologies have become 
disciplinary technologies. He explores how their increased use as tools of penality, 
(and therefore as limiters of self-creation), has had negative effects on the privacy of 
the general population. This has caused the technologies to become an arena of 
political struggle. 
The major legal mapping analysis of cyberspace is that of Andrew Chadwick. In 
                                                
24 The World Bank gives clear evidence of this in its World development Indicators. In the UK for 
example there was less than 1% of the population with access to the Internet in 1990, which rose to just 
short of 85% in 2010 available at  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2 (accessed 20 
July 2012). 
25 J Crampton, The Political Mapping of Cyberspace (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 
at 98. 
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Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies, after 
introducing the reader to cyberspace, he picks up the twin themes of both user 
empowerment and also the important role of state policy in shaping users’ rights.  
Almost inevitably this leads to a consideration of the economic power of copyright 
holders and how it is being mediated by International law.  
Chadwick argues that the propaganda which surrounds the notion of the information 
society, the so-called new “information age”, is used to reinforce the myth of 
inevitability. Inevitability, in this context, means that the symbols of the information 
society generate a mythical future, which is then turned into the natural and 
inescapable endpoint of technological progression. The information society becomes a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, demanding actions to deal with an impending social change, 
actions which actually produce the predicted social change.  His argument is that the 
Internet allows for a new “electronic face” of government, which has previously been 
unavailable. Although there are clearly areas of tension and disjuncture (as with 
surveillance for example) Chadwick predicts that social and technological change will 
largely be managed by the increasingly media savvy governments, in the same way 
that they have traditionally handled these issues.  
This seems like a true case of lawyers “seeing the elephant” of cyberspace. Initial 
optimism about the capacity of the Internet to revive/transform civil society (so called 
e-democracy) and user empowerment, has gradually been displaced by the deflation 
associated with the continued reality of government business proceeding as usual 
(albeit with more superficial attempts at consultation). 
Such developments might suggest that the major liberal democracies 
will soon converge on a Singapore-style model. The authoritarian 
city-state has long been perceived as the acme of managerial e-
government, with a ruthless focus on using IT to stamp out waste 
and duplication. However, perhaps this assumption is misleading, 
because Singapore has recently developed the successful online 
Government Consultation Portal....26 
Thus, we can see that the twin themes of the mapping theorists are not, ironically 
enough, centred around the “spaceness” of cyberspace, but around its use as a 
technology of self-creation and as a tool for state proliferation into, and control of, 
that sphere.  
The strength of these theories is that they identify the human element of the 
cybersystem and consider how it interacts with technologies. However, because they 
are engaged in the act of mapping, these images are a freeze frame of certain sections 
of this relationship at any given time. Also, like a real map, they are constrained by 
the lines of latitude and longitude they lay down for themselves. In this instance they 
are circumscribed by a predetermination to examine particular legal and political 
questions. They are descriptive rather than explanatory and as such cannot be used to 
direct or shape policy. 
2.5 Regulators 
                                                
26 A Chadwick, Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies (Oxford: 
OUP, 2006), at 323. 
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If the rise of the home PC opened the door of cyberspace to regulators, then wireless 
technologies, Web 2.0 software development techniques, and IPv6 wedged it wide 
open. In April 2012 there were more than 670 million websites (including sub pages) 
with domain names and content on the Net.27 Compared to just 18,000 in August 
1995,28 this is a total increase of more than 3.7 million percent over the last 17 years. 
However, a significant share of this increase was only generated over the last two to 
three years.29 This exponential increase has moved cyberspace to the top of the 
regulatory agenda. This increase coupled with the insights gained by the mappers 
discussed above has also lead current theorists to change how they consider 
cyberspace. Now instead of debating the nature of the space and whether or not it is a 
new legal entity, they are concerned with controlling the access to data and potential 
for interactions it provides. Thus, we see a marked increase in debates about content 
regulation over a rage of legal fields,30 cyber-security31 and ecommerce32 in legal 
discourse, whilst the practical management of the infrastructure is left to non-
governmental technical agencies like Internet Engineering task force.33 Furthermore, 
in practice regulators often subdivide issues and spread them across departments and 
discourses. Klimburg and Mirtl’s comment on cybersecurity encapsulate the wider 
problem: 
Within the general context of discussing “national cybersecurity” it 
is very important to keep in mind that it is not one single subject 
matter. Rather, it is possible to split the issue of national 
cybersecurity into five distinct perspectives or “mandates”, each of 
them usually covered by different government departments. This is 
not an ideal state. Unfortunately, there is normally always a 
significant lack of co-ordination between these organisations, and 
this lack of coordination is perhaps one of the most serious 
organisational challenges within the domain of national 
cybersecurity. Furthermore, overlap between themes and ambiguity 
is the rule, not the exception, in cybersecurity. The physical reality 
of national cybersecurity is that all these topics overlap to a large 
extent, however the bureaucratic reality as lived in nearly all 
national governments is that these subject areas are kept separate 
from each other in distinct “mandates”. Each of these mandates has 
                                                
27 Netcraft, “April 2012 Web Server Survey” (2012) available at 
 http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2012/04/04/april-2012-web-server-survey.html (accessed 20 July 
2012). 
28 M Walton, “Web reaches new milestone: 100 million sites” (2006) 
 http://edition.cnn.com/2006/TECH/internet/11/01/100millionwebsites/ (accessed 20 July 2012). 
29 See note 27 above. 
30 This area has greatly proliferated with work on content regulation including obscenity, defamation 
and copyright breach.  
31 For an overview of recent issues see D Fidler, “Recent Developments and Revelations Concerning 
Cybersecurity and Cyberspace: Implications for International Law” (2012) 6 Insights available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights120620.cfm (accessed 20 July 2012). 
32 A Alghamdi, The Law of E-Commerce: E-Contracts, E-Business (UK: AnchorHouseUK, 2011). 
33 Internet Engineering Task Force available at http://www.ietf.org/  (accessed 20 July 2012). 
(2012) 9:2 SCRIPTed 
 
143 
developed its own emphasis and even own language, despite the fact 
that they are all simply different facets of the same problem.34 
Thus, as we shall explore, despite the novelty of technological and sociological 
experiences being regulated, and the mapping of these new relationships by the 
theorists just discussed, those in the regulatory field seem to be recycling the same old 
conceptions and tropes but cloaking them in the language of regulatory models rather 
than as arguments about the “space” of cyberspace. (Even Reed and Murray whose 
work we will discuss below could be easily slotted into the cyber-libertarian 
framework.) In this section we examine some of the main modes of Internet 
governance and explain how they replicate the divisions and errors of the schools 
already described. This development although disappointing, is hardly surprising, 
after all one makes a restraint fit for an elephant, based on one’s idea of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the elephant. 
There are a number of different ways of viewing Internet regulation, both 
Guadamuz35 and Mayer-Schonberger,36 give convincing accounts of the nature of the 
existing regulatory framework, and of the need for a fundamental re-shaping of the 
discipline, if regulation is to be effective. Guadamuz bases his argument on network 
complexity, and Mayer-Schonberger on the need to blend traditional existing 
governance models together to deal with cyberspace. The reader should note that even 
in examining these two authors who try to give an overview of the area, the 
dichotomy between discourses which take technology (Guadamuz) and, discourses 
which take law (Mayer-Schonberger) as their point of origin is obvious. Yet, despite 
differences in labelling and forms of classification, both works reveal a trend with 
resonance for this work. 
The conservationists and mappers are the impetus behind the regulatory impulse. 
Information about the social conditions prevalent in cyberspace has fuelled the 
conservationist desire to protect and conserve. In particular those interested in 
protecting users and guarding national interests have felt the need to regulate across a 
number of areas. However, instead of producing fresh and responsive regulatory 
frameworks, they are being trapped within the old discourses. 
There is a clear thread of scepticism in regulatory discourse, Mayer-Schonberger 
refers to this as “state based traditionalist discourse”,37 Guadamuz makes it the crux of 
his work highlighting that the failure to recognise the self-organising capacity of the 
Internet will ultimately lead to the failure of regulatory efforts.38 
The parallels also continue strongly when one looks at the cyber-libertarian paradigm. 
                                                
34 A Klimburg and P Mirtl, “Cyberspace and Governance a Primer” (2011) available at 
http://www.oiip.ac.at/publikationen/policy-paper/publikationen-detail/article/93/cyberspace-and-
governance-a-primer.html (accessed 20 July 2012), at 9. 
35 A Guadamuz, Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation: Scale-free Law (UK: Edward Elgar, 
2011). 
36 V Mayer Schonberger, “The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation” 
(2002-2003) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 605-673. 
37 See note 36 above, at 612-618. 
38 See note 35 above, at 214-215. 
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They are directly discussed in Guadamuz work39 and clearly can be seen in Mayer-
Schonberger’s “cyber-separatists”.40 Indeed, this type of thinking proliferates across 
many of the works proposing self-regulation. Some see self-regulation as the way of 
achieving the revived civil society41 and that the correct way to resolve the issues is to 
engage more fully with the private sector stakeholders for economic as well as legal 
reasons. (Marsden’s work is one exemplar of this model.42) 
Thus, the potential insights gained by the “mappers” have largely been squandered, in 
the battle between the libertarians and the sceptics. In the fight between these two 
great elephant paradigms the green shoots of effective and responsive regulation have 
been trampled. 
2.6 Summary 
The analogies explored all suffer from some fundamental problem, they do not 
respond to the dynamic nature of cyberspace or the complexity of the human 
interactions it facilitates. Cyber-libertarians struggle to deal with competing rights, 
and they have no clear path to forming effective enforcement mechanisms. Cyber-
sceptics find it difficult to move beyond the application of established legal ideas, 
regardless of their degree of “fit” with cyberspace. Despite their political diversity 
cyber-conservationists wish to stultify some aspects of the growing and dynamic 
cyberspace phenomenon, an approach which seems transparently weak. The social 
mappers, despite some excellent data gathering, can offer only descriptive rather than 
proscriptive analysis. Regulators try to build on this work but remain mired in the old 
paradigms. 
Some key element is always missing. Theorists either focus on spatial considerations 
to the detriment of human interactions, or conversely offer a vision of interactions 
which is technologically or socially unsustainable. 
3. Recommendations 
Thus, we can see the existing analogies for cyberspace within the legal realm are 
inadequate. This paper does not seek to directly posit alternative paradigms since this 
would arguably require a large amount of empirical research beyond the present scope 
of this work. However, this paper will explore a theoretical framework wherein such 
ideation is possible. Previous models, as we have seen, have proven insufficient to 
adequately reflect cyberspace. This paper hopes to show how the best elements of 
some existing theories can be fused to resolve the problem. We shall, therefore, take 
the reader methodically through the development of this new “fusion” approach.  The 
first step in developing this framework is to consider the nature of cyberspace, much 
                                                
39 See note 35 at 83-86. 
40 See note 36 above, at 618-626. 
41 See C Fuchs, Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age (New York: Routledge, 
2008). 
42 See C Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in 
Cyberspace (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
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as Svantesson suggested. However, in order to avoid becoming technologically 
deterministic, and also to focus on the aspect of cyberspace which is pertinent to 
regulation, the examination will consider online behaviour and the sociology of how 
users view and use the space.43 The second, interconnected, step is to begin to try and 
view collective user creation of cyberspace through a different theoretical lens: a lens 
which allows us to view user behaviour as not simply a mechanistic product of legal 
or technological advances but as something more substantial and powerful in and of 
itself. This approach is an attempt to counter-balance the prevailing trend by seeking 
to fit regulation to the patterns of cyberspace not to pre-existing legal ideas. The 
theoretical framework posited here is autopoiesis which we shall now go on to discuss 
in detail. 
3.1 The theory of autopoiesis 
As a theory autopoiesis was first posited in the biological sciences to differentiate 
between the living and the non-living.44 It is an explanatory theory of how entities 
develop and govern themselves. The influential scholar Luhmann accomplished an 
interesting “theory transfer” into the world of sociology; he posited the idea that self-
organising and self-reproducing social systems (autopoietic systems) reproduce and 
maintain their structure not because of the characteristics of individuals, the 
demarcation of specific roles, or even through deliberate acts but via their process of 
communication.45 This is particularly interesting when one is considering that this 
means that systems can be self-referential. In other words they can communicate 
about their communications and develop themselves reflectively in that way. 
Cyberspace by its very nature seems perfectly suited to this form of analysis as it 
presents itself as a discrete world of interconnected communications.  
In relation to social systems, autopoiesis suggests that all that can ever accurately be 
observed is the system’s communications. Through this observation, by learning to 
understand the system’s language, or, to use Luhmann’s preferred term, the “code” it 
employs, we can work out what a system’s function is. This “code” can then develop 
into a “program” (a series of expressions in that language) which expands and 
solidifies code making it possible to do things with it. Finally, when we examine this 
program we can determine what effects it has in practice, what Luhmann calls its 
“efficiency”. Ultimately, the largest and most successful social systems outgrow 
simple language expressions and develop their own sphere or “medium” of 
communication. This would seem to have particular resonance for cyberspace which 
in effect has become its own medium. 
Social systems form part of society as we experience it and are both influential upon 
and influenced by their surrounding social systems. However, they can also be said to 
                                                
43 M Gillen, “Law 2.0, Web 2.0, Why Not Legal Sociology 2.0?” Papers of the BILETA Conference 
2008 available  at 
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Law%202.0,%20Web%202.0,%20Why%20Not%20L
egal%20Sociology%202.0%20%5BMartina%20Gillen%5D.pdf (accessed 20 July 2012). 
44 F Varela, H Maturana and R Uribe, “Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living Systems, Its 
Characterization and a Model” (1974) 5 Biosystems 187-196. 
45 N Luhmann “The Autopoiesis of Social Systems” in: F Geyer and J van der Zouwen (eds), 
Sociocybernetic Paradoxes (London & Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1986) 172-192. 
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be independent from the latter since they depend upon their own code and media for 
interpreting (or perhaps more correctly creating) their own environments and their 
own organs. Thus, what we commonly call society is made up of open yet also 
discrete social systems. This discreteness is often described as meaning that the 
system is operationally closed; in other words: that the “realness” of anything within 
the system depends on its absorption or adherence to the code of that system. This is a 
very important distinction. Luhmann himself highlights it: 
I think that the theory of autopoiesis and the theory of autopoietic 
systems...are underestimated in the radicalism of this approach. This 
radicalism goes back to the hypothesis of operational closure. This 
hypothesis implies a radical shift in epistemology, and also the 
ontology it supposes. If one accepts it and also relates it to the 
concept of autopoiesis and treats the latter as a further formulation 
of operational closure, then it is clear that it also breaks with the 
epistemology of the ontological tradition that assumed that 
something of the environment enters the understanding and that the 
environment is represented, mirrored and imitated or simulated 
within a cognizing system. In this respect the radicalism of the new 
approach can hardly be underestimated.46   
3.2 Autopoiesis and law/cyberspace 
Andrew Murray’s work is outstanding in the field of autopoiesis and cyberspace. In 
“The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment”47 Murray 
espouses a process he dubs symbiotic regulation. Symbiotic regulation works by 
utilising feedback. At the heart of the concept is the observation that there are stable 
patterns of communication in the systems that can be mapped. Note it is the pattern or 
dynamic trend of communications that is to be analysed, not every individual 
communication. A simple analogy would be that the process is like modelling the 
dynamics of a school of fish rather than studying the biology and psychology of 
individual fish.  
Once the communications patterns between the nodes (i.e. users on the network) are 
identified then we can create a regulatory matrix, a multidimensional map of the 
intersections between the law and cyberspace closed systems.  Murray identifies these 
intersections as one of the key features of networked communications. This feature 
gives rise to his vision of cyber-regulation. He proposes regulation designed to take 
advantage of those intersections to perform regulatory interventions, which will ripple 
through into the otherwise closed system. The idea is that because the 
communications trends within each system are already known then the regulator can 
design the intervention to have the desired output building upon the system’s own 
internal structures. Of course these are highly complex systems and so sometimes 
unpredicted or even unpredictable outcomes may occur. However, the feedback 
process of observing the effects and tweaking the interventions should ultimately lead 
                                                
46 Ibid, 114. 
47 A Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment (Oxford: Routledge-
Cavendish 2007). 
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to a system where the regulation and the system (in our case cyberspace) are so in 
tune with each other, and the understanding of the communications patterns so well 
mapped and understood, that the interventions cease to be trial and error but become 
truly symbiotic. Symbiotic in this case means that the regulations will be perfectly 
tailored to the regulatory environment and vice versa. Murray is confident that 
computer mapping of system dynamics would enable this to occur:  
The three-dimensional regulatory matrix...allows us to imagine the 
structure of nodal or decentralised regulation in the complex, multi-
layered, new media environment…When this model is paired with 
Mingers’ representation of autopoietic communication...it allows 
regulators to chart the communications flow within the regulatory 
matrix, enabling the construction of a ‘first order model’ of 
communication within the regulatory matrix. This first order model 
forms the foundation for an initial intervention and a series of 
dynamic feedback loops, where the results of every intervention are 
measured against the responses from each regulatory node, allowing 
for the fine-tuning of the intervention and creating ultimately robust, 
symbiotic regulation...48  
Of course, the degree of uncertainty inherent in the initial stages of this tweaking 
process is challenging to regulators. Murray views this as the major stumbling block 
to the adoption of such a regulatory model. Nevertheless, he also urges regulators to 
embrace the uncertainty and recognise that acknowledging the limits of their own 
current knowledge is the only way to advance. The current author agrees with 
Murray’s analysis, but would like to suggest that perhaps he underplays, or is too 
timid in asserting the full effects of this feedback process. Part of the reason for this 
may be that, as Svantesson  noted (see quotation above) too much attention is being 
paid to the idea that using legal norms is a given, and their goals and objectives 
should be applied to the regulatory system. To give an example from Murray’s work 
let us consider the following: 
Thus Action 1, causes a set of results and resultant feedback, for 
example adding DRMs to digital media files causes consumer 
disquiet and a rise in the activity of crackers. As a result the 
regulator considers this and makes a second intervention, Action 2. 
This may be attempts to legally control the activity of crackers 
though legislation such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or 
the Directive on Copyright and Related rights in the Information 
Society. The effect of this may be to cause a shift in focus from 
cracking to sharing through file sharing technologies, leading to a 
third order intervention in file sharing communities and so on.... It, 
like the regulatory environment, should be dynamically modelled 
over a period of months, or even years, with each new intervention 
being designed specifically with regard to the feedback received at 
                                                
48 Ibid, 257. 
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each point of intervention.49 
 
Murray clearly sees that the regulations might have to be tweaked, or varied, to 
achieve consensus, and the required goals. However, surely to achieve a true 
symbiotic relationship laws (and lawyers) must be open to having their goals 
challenged by the feedback process as well? 
Of course, if taken at face value this seems to be paradoxical. How can an 
operationally closed system like law, respond to the needs and goals of the systems it 
seeks to regulate without losing its own internal cohesion, and therefore ceasing to be 
autopoietic? Thus, law would not seem to be amenable to autopoietic explanation. At 
the very least, one would be limited to the regulatory interventions approach, adopted 
by Murray, where only a portion of the code of the system could be influenced not its 
program nor its efficiency. This however, fails to fully take into account the true 
impact of autopoietic theory on cyberspace and law. 
Two major solutions may be drawn out from existing work and applied to this 
problem. The first is to identify multiple autopoietic legal systems: rather than profess 
the unity of law (or the monolithic nature of cyberspace), it is seen as part of the 
autopoietic process that the systems reproduce in a plural fashion within the context 
of the “local logic” for the legal doctrine.50 This approach allows for cultural 
diversity, and a proliferation of legal regimes, to be seen as manifestations rather then 
refutations of the autopoietic thesis. The second solution (primarily espoused by 
Gunther Teubner)51 is to take this pluralism, and add it to Habermasian ideas of 
recursive discourse (where the citizen and the state interact in a reinvigorated public 
sphere to shape the role of the state, the role of the citizen and the boundaries of the 
public sphere itself).52 The immediate consequence of this is that it becomes plain that 
systems are closed (and in that sense autopoietic) to varying degrees; this would seem 
to once again, severely challenge the concept of law as an autopoietic system.  
However, Teubner has a further enhancement of the autopoietic thesis which resolves 
this issue. That is, the idea of inter-systemic collision law i.e. that the autopoietic 
systems set their own rules for how they interact with the less autopoietic systems (the 
partially autonomous and socially diffuse systems) and, also, how those other systems 
interact with each other inside law’s domain. For example law dictates how citizens 
and state interact together in the public sphere and thus even how that sphere is 
defined. These rules can be seen to operate between and among various social sub-
systems, between state law and other quasi-legal orders and finally in conflicts within 
law.53 In relation to cyberspace this would again account for observable trends, like 
                                                
49 A Murray, “Regulating the Post-Regulatory Cyber-State” available online at 
http://works.bepress.com/andrew_murray/7/, at 23-24.   
50 K Ladeur, “Perspektiven einer post-modernen Rechtstheorie: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit N. 
Luhmanns Konzept der 'Einheit des Rechtssystems” (1985) 16  Rechtstheorie 383-427, at 426. 
51 G Teubner Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
52 J Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1989). 
53 See Note 50 above, at 100-122. 
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local responses to specific laws for example, without destroying the possibility of 
viewing cyberspace as an autopoietic system. Response to the law could be viewed as 
openness at a secondary level whilst the core activities of interaction would still 
otherwise be closed and controlled.  
Thus, autopoiesis offers a theory of law which recognises that there can be a range of 
legal systems and quasi-systems interacting (communicating) together and that law 
can and should be responsive to these without losing its internal consistency and 
autonomy. The corollary of this is that the observation of these interactions can 
outline the nature of the law. If autopoiesis can be applied to something as diverse and 
complex as law which has these parallels with cyberspace then it can be applied to 
cyberspace itself. Such an application of theory may ultimately serve to close the gap 
between law and cyberspace. Murray’s regulatory methods could be saved and indeed 
enhanced by being truly open to the feedback process which would allow them to be 
applied toward well designed goals suitable for the cyberspace medium.  
4. Conclusion  
This article has focused on the mismatch between law and cyberspace and suggested 
that close observation of user behaviour within an autopoietic theoretical framework 
may offer a solution to our current theoretical impasse. The reasons for this are 
compelling. Autopoiesis is a theory which focuses on communication and language 
media which makes it ideal for exploring cyberspace, a space created not by 
geological phenomena but the exchange of data. Furthermore, autopoiesis permits 
cyberspace to be viewed as an entity in its own right (rather than as a mere subject of 
any other social phenomenon, in particular law) yet, allows us to account for the 
localised social reality, that other factors, including law, and technology, can affect its 
development. Finally, Murray’s methods offer a concrete path to the application of 
law to cyberspace, in the form of effective regulation. However, we must build on 
them to consider the nature of our regulatory goals as well as our regulatory methods, 
if this potential is to be fulfilled.  
Of course, this is only a beginning. The work identifying the language and medium of 
cyberspace must take place in order for this model to become a functional regulatory 
tool. This theory offers the chance for us to view and analyse the debate in a different 
way, a way which eschews methods and viewpoints we already know to be flawed. 
Thus, perhaps the gap between law and cyberspace will cease to be infinite and 
unbridgeable. Users and regulators might once again build and explore cyberspace 
with the joy and hope of a child seeing their first circus elephant. 
 
 
